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Abstract: Websites and applications use personalisation services to profile their users, collect their
patterns and activities and eventually use this data to provide tailored suggestions. User preferences
and social interactions are therefore aggregated and analysed. Every time a user publishes a new post
or creates a link with another entity, either another user, or some online resource, new information is
added to the user profile. Exposing private data does not only reveal information about single users’
preferences, increasing their privacy risk, but can expose more about their network that single actors
intended. This mechanism is self-evident in social networks where users receive suggestions based
on their friends’ activities. We propose an information-theoretic approach to measure the differential
update of the anonymity risk of time-varying user profiles. This expresses how privacy is affected
when new content is posted and how much third-party services get to know about the users when
a new activity is shared. We use actual Facebook data to show how our model can be applied to
a real-world scenario.
Keywords: privacy; anonymity risk; dynamic user profile; online footprints
1. Introduction
Personalisation and advertising services collect user’s activities to provide tailored suggestions.
This data contributes to form over time what is considered the user online footprint. With the term
online footprint, we include every possible trace left by individuals when using communication
services. It follows that the same notion of digital footprint spans all layers of the Internet protocol
suite conceptual model (TCP/IP), depending on the type of data taken into consideration. It is also
important to note that the digital footprint of an individual is formed by their interaction with their
social relationships, not only by their singular actions on a medium or platform.
We can therefore consider users’ online footprints as linked data, where each event generated
by a single user includes information regarding other users but also regarding other events and
entities. This way of considering online footprints is very similar to the very structure of the Web,
where web pages link to other pages when they reference a certain individual or object. This social
and interconnected aspect of digital footprints is particularly evident for services like Facebook [1],
where users are suggested new pages and social connections based on their friends’ network of
relationships and expressed preferences or likes.
Users’ profiles also change over time, reflecting how real-world individuals change their tastes
and preferences in comparison to, for example, a reference population. Every time new information is
shared, the user is disclosing more about themselves or their social interactions, eventually changing
their privacy risk.
More importantly, users tend to share their data and access to their identity accounts, such as
Google [2] or Facebook [1], when interacting with third-party applications. These applications use
federated log in mechanisms through the user’s identity account. To use the application, users grant
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it a certain level of access to their private data through their profile. This data includes details about
their real offline identity, their whereabouts and in some situations even the company they work for.
Once it has gained access, the application can now store user data and assume control over how it is
further shared. The user will never be notified again about who is accessing their data, nor if these are
transferred to third parties.
This aspect of privacy protection is particularly relevant since the right to privacy is commonly
interpreted as the user’s right to prevent information disclosure. When a user shares some content
online, they are actively choosing to disclose some of their profile. At the same time, though, they
might give away more that they intended, since no information is shared from app and service about
how the profile is analysed or how the user’s data is further shared.
Online services ask the user to access certain information, yet no concrete information is passed
on about how the data will be used or stored. Furthermore, these services are often designed as
mobile applications where all the devices installing the app communicate with a centralised server and
constantly exchange users’ information, eventually allowing for unknown third parties, or potential
attackers, to fetch and store this data. In addition, this information is often shared with insecure
communication through the HTTP protocol, making it possible for a malicious entity to intercept these
communications and steal user data.
In this model, the management of privacy and trust of the platform to which users handle their
data is highly centralised. The user entrusts the service with all their data, often as part of a service
agreement. Generally, a few services control the market and therefore can inevitably know more
about the users. This is the case of popular email or messaging services, but also social networks,
relationship apps and so on. These entities can easily know who is talking to whom and sometimes
also the topic of their conversations.
Contribution
We analyse user online footprints as a series of events belonging to a certain individual. Each event
is a document containing different pieces of information. An event corresponds to an action generated
by the user or one of their devices. When a user visits a website or creates a post on a blog, an event
is created. We can think of an event as a hypermedia document, i.e., an object possibly containing
graphics, audio, video, plain text, and hyperlinks. We call the hyperlinks selectors, and we use
them to build the connections between the user’s different identities or events. Each identity can be
a profile or account that the user has created onto a service or platform, or just a collection of events,
revealing something about the user. With account, we mean an application account or a social network
account, such as their LinkedIn or Facebook unique IDs.
When the user decides to share some new content, or subscribes to a service by sharing part of
their profile data, novel information is released. This information is either made public or shared to a
group of people, like for a new social network post, or it is rather shared to a third party app.
We are interested to measure the differential update of the anonymity risk of user profiles due to
a marginal release of novel information, based on an information-theoretic measure of anonymity risk,
precisely, the Kullback–Leibler divergence between a user profile and the average population’s profile.
We particularly considered real data shared by Facebook users as part of the
Facebook-Tracking-Exposed project [3]. For the purpose of this study, we considered categorised
Facebook posts. We imagined that an attacker is interested in capturing users’ preferences by looking at
their posts and imagined a scenario where the information shared through a new event (i.e., sharing new
content) increases or decreases the user’s privacy risk, in other words, how much an attacker knows
about them, once they have captured the new information.
In this work, we build upon a recent information-theoretic model for measuring the privacy
risk incurred in the disclosure of a user’s interests though online activity. Among other refinements,
we incorporate an aspect of substantial practical importance in the aforementioned model, namely,
the aspect of time-varying user profiles.
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More precisely, we propose a series of refinements of a recent information-theoretic model
characterising a user profile by means of a histogram of categories of interest, and measuring
the corresponding privacy risk as the Kullback–Leibler divergence with respect to the histogram
accounting for the interests of the overall population. Loosely speaking, this risk may be interpreted
as an anonymity risk, in the sense that the interests of a specific user may diverge from those of the
general population. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We preface our main analysis with an argument to tackle populations in which the distribution of
profiles of interest is multimodal, that is, user profiles concentrate around distinguishable clusters
of archetypical interests. We suggest that the said information-theoretic model be applied after
segmentation of the overall population according to demographic factors, effectively extending
the feasibility of the original, unimodal proposal.
• However, the most important refinement and undoubtedly the main focus of this paper consists
in the extension of the aforementioned model to time-varying user profiles. Despite the practical
significance of the aspect of time in the analysis of privacy risks derived from disclosed online
activity, it is nevertheless an aspect all too often neglected, which we strive to remedy with this
preliminary proposal. Here, the time variation addresses not only changes over time in the
interests of a user, construed as a dynamic profile, but also novel activity of a possibly static
profile, in practice known only in part.
• The changes in anonymity risk are formulated as a gradient of the Kullback–Leibler divergence
of a user profile reflecting newly observed activity, with respect to a past history, and are inspired
in the abstract formulation of Bregman projections onto convex sets, whose application to the
field of privacy is, to the best of our knowledge, entirely novel.
• For a given activity and history, we investigate the profile updates leading to the best and
worst overall anonymity risk, and connect the best case to the fairly recent information-theoretic
framework of optimised query forgery and tag suppression for privacy protection.
• We contemplate certain special cases of interest. On the one hand, we provide a corollary of our
analysis for the special case in which the anonymity risk is measured as the Shannon entropy of
the user profile. On the other hand, we particularise our model in the extreme case in which the
new observation consists of a single sample of categorised online activity.
• Last but not least, we verify and illustrate our model with a series of examples and experiments
with both synthetic and real online activity.
2. State-of-the-Art
Online services and applications constantly share user-generated data in the form of information
regarding locations, browsing habits, communication records, health information, financial information,
and general preferences regarding user’s online and offline activities. This information is often shared
with third-party services, in order to provide tailored product experience or to receive other services.
A common example of this are third-party analytics services used by websites and mobile applications
to understand user behaviour within their product. This level of access to generated data is often
directly granted from the user of such services. On a wide number of occasions, though, private
information is captured by online services without the direct user consent or even knowledge.
For example, to personalise their services or offer tailored advertising, web applications could use
tracking services that identify a user through different networks [4,5]. These tracking services usually
combine information from different profiles that users create—for example, their Gmail address or
their Facebook or LinkedIn accounts. In addition, specific characteristics of the user’s device can
be used to identify them through different sessions and websites, as described by the Panopticlick
project [6].
Tags or interest-based profiling is another approach for web applications to collect and analyse
users’ behaviour that has been studied extensively in the literature. Category-based filtering techniques
are very popular for web search applications. In recommendation systems employing tags or in any
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system allowing resource annotation, users decide to disclose personal data in order to receive,
in exchange, a certain benefit [7]. This earned value can be quantified in terms of the customised
experience of a certain product. In the realm of geographical filtering, for example, tags are used to
monitor user interests connected to places, and suggest events and places of interest [8].
When users generate more activity across a platform, their profile changes over time.
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) have been proposed following the idea of perturbing the
information implicitly or explicitly disclosed by the user. They therefore represent a possible alternative
to hinder attackers in their efforts to profile their activity precisely, when using a personalised
service. The submission of bogus user data, together with genuine data, is an illustrative example of
a data-perturbative mechanism. In the context of information retrieval, query forgery [9,10] prevents
privacy attackers from profiling users accurately based on the content of queries, without having to
trust the service provider or the network operator, but obviously at the cost of traffic overhead. In this
kind of mechanism, the perturbation itself typically takes place on the user side. This means that users
do not need to trust any external entity such as the recommender, the Internet Service Provider (ISP)
or their neighbouring peers. Naturally, this does not signify that data perturbation cannot be used in
combination with other third-party based approaches or mechanisms relying on user collaboration.
The problem of measuring user privacy in systems that profile users is complex. After modelling
user profiles as histograms of relative frequencies of online activity along predefined categories of
interest, References [9,11] propose the use of Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler divergence for
a quantifiable measure of user privacy, in part justified by Jaynes’ rationale on maximum entropy
methods [12].
Certainly, the distortion of user profiles for privacy protection may be done not only by means
of the insertion of false activity, but also by suppression. An example of this latter kind of data
perturbation is the elimination of tags as a privacy-enhancing strategy [13,14]. This strategy allows
users to preserve their privacy to a certain degree, but it comes at the cost of some degradation in
the usability of the service. Precisely, the privacy-utility trade-off posed by the suppression of tags
was investigated mathematically in [13], measuring privacy as the Shannon entropy of the perturbed
profile, and utility as the percentage of tags users are willing to eliminate. Closely related to this
are also other studies regarding the impact of suppressive PETs [15–17], where the impact of tag
suppression is assessed experimentally in the context of various applications and real-world scenarios.
This is particularly relevant when online services provide the users with the perception that
sharing less data impacts their optimal service experience. Different classes of applications are being
developed based on the concept of serendipitous discoveries. The idea of serendipity wants the
user to accidentally discover people, places and/or interests around them. To present the user with
a tailored and seamless experience, serendipity applications need to learn the user’s preferences and
interests, as well as specific personal information, like their physical location, their work place or their
social circles. This is usually accomplished by connecting several of the user’s identities with other
social networks [18]. A typical example is asking the user to register onto an application through
their Facebook, Twitter, or Google+ account. This technique usually consists of a variant of the
OAuth2.0 protocol used to confirm a person’s identity and to control which data they will share with
the application requesting log in.
Another important aspect to consider is that the average online user joins different social
networks with the objective to enjoy distinct services and features. On each service or application,
an identity gets created containing personal details, preferences, generated content, and a network
of relationships. The set of attributes used to describe these identities is often unique to the user.
In addition, applications or services sometimes require the disclosure of different personal information,
such as email or full name, to create a profile. Users possessing different identities on different services,
often use those to verify another identity on a particular application, i.e., a user will employ their
Facebook and LinkedIn profile to verify their account on the third service [19]. A piece of information
required by one service could, in fact, add credibility to the information the user has provided for
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a second application, by demonstrating that certain personal details overlap, and by adding other
information—for example, a set of shared social relationships.
Users’ online footprints could therefore be reconstructed by combining the publicly available
information provided to different services [20,21]. A possible attacker could start by identifying
a common pseudonym, i.e., a username that users often use across different social networks,
and then goes on measuring how many possible profiles it can find across different services. Therefore,
a user’s activity on one site can implicitly reveal their identity on another site, also investigating how
locations attached to posts could be used uniquely to identify a profile among a certain number of
similar candidates.
The analysis of publicly available attributes in public profiles shows a correlation between the
amount of information revealed in social network profiles, specific occupations or job titles, and use of
pseudonyms. It is possible to identify certain patterns regarding how and when users reveal precise
information [22]. Finally, aggregating this information can lead an attacker to obtain direct contact
information by cross-linking the obtained features with other publicly available sources, such as online
phone directories. A famous method for information correlation was presented by Alessandro Acquisti
and Ralph Gross [23]. Leveraging on the correlation between individuals’ social security numbers
and their birth data, they were able to infer people’s social security numbers by using only publicly
available information.
Social connections can be inferred also by user behaviours. Messaging services, applications able
to access messages, or phone metadata are able to predict conversations patterns, and, eventually,
users’ relationships. An example is the study of telephone metadata to infer whether a user is
or is not in a relationship based on their mutual call frequencies [24]. A user’s social graph and
community network structures can therefore also be derived by studying communications patterns.
This technique is often used by friends’ recommendation systems [25], often clustering people based
on their interactions, therefore creating implicit groups.
3. An Information-Theoretic Model for Measuring Anonymity Risk
In this section, we build upon a recent information-theoretic model for measuring the privacy
risk incurred in the disclosure of a user’s interests though online activity. Among other refinements,
we incorporate an aspect of substantial practical importance in the aforementioned model, namely,
the aspect of time-varying user profiles.
Consider a user profile p, together with an average population profile q, both represented as
histograms of relative frequencies of online activity along predefined categories of interest i = 1, . . . ,m.
In the absence of a specific statistical model on the frequency distribution of user profiles, as argued
extensively in [9,11,26] on the basis of Jaynes’ rationale for maximum entropy methods, we assume
that anonymity risk may be adequately measured as the Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence D(p‖q) between
the user profile p and the population’s q. The idea is that user profiles become less common as they
diverge from the average of the population. Precisely, we define anonymity risk as
R def= D(p‖q) def=
m
∑
i=1
pi log
pi
qi
.
Usually, the basis of logarithm is 2 and the units of the divergence are bits.
Intuitively, the empirical histogram of relative frequencies (or type) t of n independent,
identically distributed drawings should approach the true distribution t¯ as n increases. Those drawings
may be loosely interpreted as sequences of online queries according to some underlying user interests
represented by t¯. More technically, the extension of Jaynes’ approximation to KL divergences for
a sequence of independent events shows that the probability pT(t) of the empirical distribution t is
related to the KL divergence D(t‖t¯) with respect to the true distribution t¯ by means of the limit
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− 1n log pT(t) −−−→n→∞ D(t‖t¯).
According to this model, the user profile p plays the role of the empirical distribution t, and the
population’s profile q, the role of the true distribution t¯. In a way, we construe a user profile as
an empirical instantiation of the population’s profile. Concordantly, the divergence D(p‖q) between
the user profile p and the population’s q is a measure of how rare p should be, which we regard in turn
as a measure of anonymity risk. The argument that the rarity of a profile may also be understood as
a measure of how sensitive a user profile may be considered offers a measure of privacy risk. Admittedly,
this model is limited to applications where the underlying assumptions may be deemed adequate,
particularly when no specific, possibly multimodal distribution of the user profiles is available.
Another helpful interpretation of this measure stems from rewriting the user profile as a distribution
pI|J of a random variable I indexing online activity into predefined categories i = 1, . . . ,m, conditioned
on the user identity J, defined on the user indexes j = 1, . . . ,n. Observing that the population profile is
the expectation across all user profiles,
qI = EJ pI|J(·|J), (more explicitly, qI(i) = 1n
n
∑
j=1
pI|J(i|j) for all i),
we immediately conclude that the expected risk is
EJ R(J) = EJ D
(
pI|J(·|J)
∥∥∥ qI) = I(I; J),
namely, the mutual information between the online activity I and the user identity J.
3.1. Multimodality of the KL Divergence Model and Conditioning on Demography
Perhaps one of the major limitations of the direct application of the KL divergence model for
characterising the anonymity of a profile is made clear when the distribution of profiles is concentrated
around several predominant modes, contradicting the implicit unimodal assumption revolving around
the population’s profile q. Intuitively, one may expect several clusters in which profiles are concentrated,
corresponding to various demographic groups, characterised by sex, age, cultural background, etc.
In order to work around this apparent limitation, we may simply partition the data into
a number of meaningful demographic groups, indexed by k, and calculate the average population
profile qI|K(·|k) for each group k. Then, redefine the demographically contextualised anonymity risk as
the KL divergence between the profile pI|J(·|j) of user j, in group k(j), and the corresponding reference
qI|K(·|k(j)), that is,
Rcontext(j) def= D
(
pI|J(·|j)
∥∥∥ qI|K(·|k(j))) .
Obviously, the model will be suitable as long as the profile distribution is unimodal within each
demographic context, in the absence of a more specific model. Note that the measure of anonymity
risk of the disclosed interests is now conditioned on demographic data potentially observable by
a privacy attacker.
3.2. Gradient of the KL Divergence and Information Projection
Before addressing the problem of the differential update per se, we quickly review an interesting
result on the gradient of the KL divergence, and its application to convex projections with said
divergence. Directly from the definition of the KL divergence between distributions p and q for
a general logarithmic basis, compute the gradient on the first argument
∇pD(p‖q) =
(
log
pi
qi
+ log e
)
i
.
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Swift algebraic manipulation shows that
D(p‖q) = D(p‖p∗) + D(p∗‖q) +∇p∗D(p∗‖q)T(p− p∗), (1)
for any additional distribution p∗, where the constant term log e in the gradient becomes superfluous,
on account of the fact that ∑i pi − p∗i = 0. Observe that part of the above expression may be readily
interpreted as the Taylor expansion of D(p‖q) about p∗,
D(p‖q) = D(p∗‖q) +∇p∗D(p∗‖q)T(p− p∗) +O(‖p− p∗‖2), (2)
with error precisely D(p‖p∗).
In the context of convex projections, suppose that we wish to find the closest point p∗ inside
a convex setP to a reference point q, in KL divergence, succinctly,
p∗ = arg min
p∈P
D(p‖q).
This problem is represented in Figure 1. The solution p∗ is called the information projection of q
ontoP . Because for such p∗ the projection of the gradient of the objective onto the vector difference
p− p∗ for any p ∈P must be nonnegative, i.e.,
∇p∗D(p∗‖q)T(p− p∗) > 0,
we may conclude from the previous equality involving the gradient that
D(p‖q) > D(p‖p∗) + D(p∗‖q).
This last inequality is, in fact, a known generalisation of the Pythagorean theorem for projections
onto convex sets, generally involving obtuse triangles. (The expression relating the gradient with
a set of divergences shown here may be readily generalised to prove an analogue of the Pythagorean
theorem for Bregman projections. Recall that Bregman divergences encompass both squared Euclidean
distances and KL divergences as a special case. An alternative proof of the Pythagorean theorem for
KL divergences, which inspired a small part of the analysis in this manuscript, can be found in [27]
(Theorem 11.6.1)).
 
𝑞𝑞 
𝑝𝑝∗ ∇𝑝𝑝∗D(𝑝𝑝∗‖𝑞𝑞) 
𝑝𝑝 
P 
𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝∗ 
min
𝑝𝑝∈P
D(𝑝𝑝‖𝑞𝑞) 
Figure 1. Information projection p∗ of a reference distribution q onto a convex setP .
3.3. Differential Update of the Anonymity Risk Due to Revealing New Information
Under this simple model, we consider the following problem. Suppose that the distribution p0
represents a history of online activity of a given user up to this time, with associated anonymity risk
D(p0‖q). Consider now a series of new queries, with interests matching a profile p1 and associated risk
D(p1‖q) (Figure 2). If those new queries were observed, the overall user profile would be updated to
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pα = (1− α)p0 + αp1,
where the activity parameter α ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of new queries with respect to the total amount
of queries released. We investigate the updated anonymity risk (Figure 3)
D((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q),
in terms of the risks associated with the past and current activity, for a marginal activity increment α.
To this end, we analyse the first argument of the KL divergence, in the form of a convex combination,
through a series of quick preliminary lemmas. (The mathematical proofs and results developed here
may be generalised in their entirety from KL divergences to Bregman divergences, and they are loosely
inspired by a fundamental Pythagorean inequality for Bregman projections on convex sets.)
Figure 2. Probability simplices showing, the population distribution q, the user’s profile p0, and the
updated profile p1.
Figure 3. Probability simplices showing the population distribution q = (0.417, 0.333, 0.250), the user’s
profile p0 = (0.167, 0.333, 0.500), and the updated profile p1 = (0.167, 0.167, 0.666). The intermediate
points show the value of pα for different α.
On the one hand, since the KL divergence is a convex function, we may bound the updated risk as
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) 6 (1− α)D(p0‖q) + αD(p1‖q). (3)
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On the other hand, we may resort to our previous gradient analysis in Section 3.2, specifically to
Equations (1) and (2), to write the first-order Taylor approximation
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) = (1− α)D(p0‖q) + αD(p1‖q)− αD(p1‖p0) +O(α2). (4)
This last expression is consistent with the convexity bound (3), and, quite intuitively, the term
−αD(p1‖p0) in the Taylor approximation refining the convex bound vanishes for negligible activity α
or new activity profile p1 similar to the history p0 revealed thus far. We may alternatively write the
updated risk as an increment with respect to that based on the user’s online history, as
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q)−D(p0‖q) = α (D(p1‖q)−D(p0‖q)−D(p1‖p0)) +O(α2),
which we observe to be approximately proportional to the relative activity parameter α, and to
an expression that only depends on the divergences between the profiles involved.
3.4. Special Cases of Delta Update and Uniform Reference
In the special case when the new activity contains a single query, the new profile p1 is a Kronecker
delta δi at some category i. In this case,
D(p1‖q) = D(δi‖q) = − log qi, and
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) = (1− α)D(p0‖q) + α log p0 iqi +O(α
2).
A second corollary follows from taking the reference profile q as the uniform distribution u = 1m ,
and replacing KL divergences in Equations (3) and (4) with Shannon entropies according to
D(p‖u) = logm−H(p). (5)
Precisely,
H ((1− α)p0 + αp1) > (1− α)H(p0) + αH(p1), (6)
consistently with the concavity of the entropy, and
H ((1− α)p0 + αp1) = (1− α)H(p0) + αH(p1) + αD(p1‖p0) +O(α2). (7)
Even more specifically, in the case of a delta update p1 = δi and uniform reference profile,
H ((1− α)p0 + αp1) = (1− α)H(p0)− α log p0 i +O(α2).
3.5. Best and Worst Update
For a given activity α and history p0, we investigate the profile updates p1 leading to the best
and worst overall anonymity risk D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q). The problem of finding the best profile,
yielding the smallest risk, is formally identical to that of optimal query forgery extensively analysed
in [9]. Note that this problem may also be interpreted as the information projection of the population
profile q onto the convex set of possible forged profiles
P = {(1− α)p0 + αp1} ,
with fixed α and p0, a scaled, translated probability simplex. In this case, the generalized Pythagorean
theorem shown earlier guarantees
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) > D ((1− α)p0 + αp∗1‖(1− α)p0 + αp1) + D ((1− α)p0 + αp∗1‖q) .
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We may now turn to the case of the worst profile update p1, leading to the highest
anonymity risk. Consider two distributions p and q on the discrete support alphabet i = 1, . . . ,m,
representing predefined categories of interest in our context. Recall that p is said to be absolutely
continuous with respect to q, denoted p  q, whenever qi = 0 implies pi = 0 for each i. Otherwise,
if for some i, we had pi > 0 but qi = 0, then D(p‖q) = ∞. In the context at hand, we may assume that
the population profile incorporates all categories of interest, so that qi > 0, which ensures absolute
continuity, i.e., p q. Therefore, we would like to solve
max
p1q
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) .
We shall distinguish two special cases, and leave the general maximisation problem for future
investigation. Let us tackle first the simpler case α = 1, and call p1 = p. Recall that the cross-entropy
between two distributions p and q is defined as
H(p‖q) = −
m
∑
i=1
pi log qi,
and is related to the (Shannon) entropy and the KL divergence via
H(p‖q) = H(p) + D(p‖q).
Clearly,
max
pq H(p‖q) = − log qmin,
attained for p = δi corresponding to the category i minimising q. It turns out that this is also the
solution to the maximisation problem in the divergence because
D(p‖q) = H(p‖q)−H(p),
and H(δi) = 0, which means that p = δi simultaneously maximises the cross-entropy and minimises
the entropy.
The second special case we aim to solve is that of a uniform reference q = u, discussed in
Section 3.4. The corresponding problem is
min
p1
H ((1− α)p0 + αp1) .
We claim that the worst profile update p1 is again a Kronecker delta, but this time at the category
i maximising p0. Indeed, assume without loss of generality that p0 is sorted in decreasing order,
observe that (1− α)p0 + αδ1 majorises any other convex combination (1− α)p0 + αp1, and recall that
the entropy is Schur-concave.
As for the general case, the associated cross-entropy problem is fairly simple. We have
max
p1q
H ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) = (1− α)H(p0‖q)− α log qmin, (8)
for p = δi at the category minimising q. Unfortunately, the terms in the difference
D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) = H ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q)−H ((1− α)p0 + αp1)
are respectively maximised and minimised for deltas at different categories, in general, namely that
minimising q, and that maximising p0. We may however provide an upper bound on the anonymity
risk based on these considerations; by virtue of the convexity of the divergence and the previous result
on its maximisation,
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D ((1− α)p0 + αp1‖q) 6 (1− α)D(p0‖q)− α log qmin. (9)
4. Experimental Results
In the previous section, we formulated the theoretical problem of the differential update of
the anonymity risk of time-varying user profiles due to a marginal release of novel information,
based on an information-theoretic measure of anonymity risk, specifically, the Kullback–Leibler (KL)
divergence between a user profile and the average population’s profile. In this section, we verify
the theoretical conclusions drawn in the referred section with a series of numerical examples and
experimental scenarios.
More precisely, we analyse the updated anonymity risk in terms of the profile’s history and the
current activity, for a given marginal increment α. Furthermore, we present how, with a fixed an
activity parameter α and given a certain initial profile, it is possible to identify the best and worst
profile update leading to a new privacy risk. All of this is shown for the general case of anonymity risk
measured as the KL divergence between a user profile and the overall profile of a population, and for
the special case in which the population’s profile is assumed uniform, in which divergences become
Shannon entropies.
The examples simply resort to synthetic values of the reference profiles. As for the experimental
scenario, we employ Facebook data. We consider a user sharing some new information through a series
of posts on their timeline. We are interested in verifying the theoretical analysis carried out in this
work. All divergences and entropies are in bits.
4.1. Synthetic Examples
In our first proposed example, we choose an initial profile p0 = (1/6, 1/3, 1/2), representing a user’s
past online history, an updated profile p1 = (1/6, 1/6, 2/3) containing more recent activity,
and a population distribution q = (5/12, 1/3, 1/4) of reference, across three hypothetical categories
of interest. For different values of the recent activity parameter α, Figure 4a plots the anonymity
risk D(pα‖q) of our synthetic example of updated user profile pα = (1− α)p0 + αp1, with respect
to the population’s profile q, the user’s history p0, and the recent activity p1. Specifically, we verify
the convexity bound (3) and the first-order Taylor approximation (4) in our theoretical analysis.
In addition, we plot Figure 4b the special case of uniform population profile, in which the anonymity
risk becomes H(pα). We should hasten to point out that the dually additive relationship (5) between
KL divergence and entropy translates to vertically reflected versions of analogous plots, verifying the
entropic properties (6) and (7).
In our second example, we consider two categories of interest, so that profiles actually represent
a binary preference. In this simple setting, profiles are completely determined by a single scalar p,
corresponding to the relative frequency of one of the two categories, 1− p being the other frequency.
We fix the activity parameter α = 1/20, set the historical profile to p0 = 2/3, the reference profile to
q = 3/5, and verify the analysis on the worst anonymity risk update of Section 3.5 plotting D(pα‖q)
against profile updates p1 ranging from 0 to 1, where, as usual, pα = (1− α)p0 + αp1. We illustrate this
both for the privacy risk based on the KL divergence, in Figure 5a, and for the special case of Shannon
entropy, in Figure 5b.
In the entropy case, our analysis, summarised in the minimisation problem (8), concluded that
the worst update is a delta in the most frequent category. In this simple example with two categories,
since p0 > 1/2, the worst update corresponds to p1 = 1, giving the lowest entropy. The reference line
in the plot corresponds to H(p0) ≈ 0.918 bit. For the more general measure of risk as a divergence,
since q = 3/5, we have qmin = 2/5, and the bound (9) becomes
D(pα‖q) 6 (1− α)D(p0‖q)− α log2 qmin ≈ 0.0791,
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fairly loose for the particular values of this example. The reference line in the plot indicates
D(p0‖q) ≈ 0.0137.
These two examples confirm that new activity certainly has an impact on the overall anonymity
risk, in accordance with the quantitative analysis in Section 3.5. This can of course be regarded
from the perspective of introducing dummy queries in order to alter the apparent profile of interests,
for example, in line with the problem of optimized query forgering investigated in [9].
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Figure 4. For different values of the recent activity parameter α, we plot (a) the anonymity risk D(pα‖q)
of a synthetic example of updated user profile pα = (1− α)p0 + αp1, with respect to the population’s
profile q = (5/12, 1/3, 1/4), across three hypothetical categories of interest, where p0 = (1/6, 1/3, 1/2)
represents the user’s online history, and p1 = (1/6, 1/6, 2/3) contains the recent activity in the form
of a histogram. We verify the convexity bound (3) and the first-order Taylor approximation (4) in our
theoretical analysis. In addition, we plot (b) the special case of uniform population profile, in which
the anonymity risk becomes H(pα).
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Figure 5. In this example, we consider two categories of interest; therefore, profiles are completely
determined by a single scalar p, being 1− p the other frequency. We fix the activity parameter α = 1/20,
set the historical profile to p0 = 2/3, the reference profile to q = 3/5, and verify the analysis on the
worst anonymity risk update of Section 3.5 plotting (a) D(pα‖q) against profile updates p1 ranging
from 0 to 1. In the entropy case (b), we plot H(pα).
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4.2. Experiment Based on Facebook Data
We continue our verification of the theory presented, this time with experiments based on Facebook
data, that is, a realistic scenario for which a population of users is sharing posts on Facebook. For the
purpose of this study, we have used data extracted from the Facebook-Tracking-Exposed project [3],
where users contribute their data to gain more insights on Facebook personalisation algorithm.
The extracted dataset contained 59,188 posts of 4975 timelines, categorised over 10 categories of
interest. We selected two users out of this dataset and considered the total of posts collected for each of
them, i.e., their entire timelines. The population distribution for the users in the dataset is expressed
by the following Probability Mass Function (PMF):
q = (0.0401, 0.0870, 0.1485, 0.1691, 0.1025, 0.2081, 0.0435, 0.0525, 0.0558, 0.0924).
Note that q is computed by taking into account not only the selected users, but the entire population
of users across the dataset.
For each user, we considered a historical profile comprised of the entirety of their posts minus
a window of 15 posts. Over this window, we consider a smaller sliding window for computing p1,
of five posts, hence we set the activity parameter α = w/L, where L = len(timeline) is the total number
of posts in the timeline, and w represents the sliding window of five posts (Figure 6). For User A
αA = 0.0182, while for User B αB = 0.0820. This choice captures the idea that we want to simulate how
the profile changes when the user shares n new posts.
Figure 6. The image represents how the user initial profile was computed starting from the timeline
data included in the dataset. Furthermore, we show how the window W of 15 posts is chosen from the
last post of the series and how we considered a sliding window w of five posts each time.
For User A, we consider a series 376 shared posts, and, for User B, we consider a total of 61 posts.
We can express the two users’ profiles with the following PMFs:
p(A)0 = (0.0146, 0.0036, 0.0810, 0.2311, 0.0397, 0.1931, 0.0156, 0.0324, 0.3705, 0.0179),
p(B)0 = (0.0159, 0.0090, 0.0804, 0.2280, 0.0609, 0.1991, 0.0194, 0.0749, 0.2846, 0.0274).
For the set value of activity parameter α, Figure 7a,c plot the anonymity risk D(pα‖q) between
a user’s updated profile pα = (1− α)p0 + αp1, with respect to the population distribution q. Recall that
p0 is a user’s profile in the Facebook dataset, built taking into consideration a long series of samples.
This captures the idea that a user’s profile is computed out of their history over a long series of actions.
These experiments confirm the theoretical analysis and examples presented, verifying in a
real-world setting the convexity bound (3) and the first-order Taylor approximation (4) described in
our theoretical analysis. In addition, we can compute the bound (9) for the general measure of the
privacy risk as the KL divergence, which becomes, for User A,
D(pα‖q) 6 (1− α)D(p0‖q)− α log2 qmin ≈ 0.8870,
and for User B,
D(pα‖q) 6 0.7723.
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Furthermore, we considered, in Figure 7b,d, the privacy risk increments between the user profiles
and an updated profile given by a certain activity over time. Recall that these deltas are computed as
∆R = D(pα‖q)−D(p0‖q),
to show how a certain activity can theoretically result in an anonymity risk gain or loss.
Note that the theoretical analysis and results proposed in this article apply to dynamic profiles
that change over time. This aspect is particularly interesting, since we are not simply considering
profiles as a snapshot of the user’s activity, over a small interval, but we are also taking into account
changes in interests and general behaviour that can impact the privacy risk.
As a result, we can reach another interesting observation, which consists of the fact that
profiles might have different privacy risks in different moments of time. This confirms the intuitive
assumption that individuals might change their tastes and interests compared to a reference population,
therefore having an impact on their overall privacy risk. In this case, we reasonably assume that the
profile of certain individuals might change more rapidly over time than that of the entire population.
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Figure 7. The figure considers the privacy risk (b,d) between a user profile and a reference population
distribution for two Facebook users, that we shall call User A and User B, and the risk increment (a,c)
∆R = D(pα‖q)−D(p0‖q), where p0 is a user’s profile in the Facebook dataset and q is the reference
population distribution calculated for all the posts in the dataset.
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5. Conclusions
We proposed a series of refinements of a recent information-theoretic model of a user profile
expressed through a histogram of categories of interest. The corresponding privacy risk is measured as
the Kullback–Leibler divergence with respect to the histogram accounting for the interests of the overall
population. Loosely speaking, this risk may be interpreted as an anonymity risk, in the sense that the
interests of a specific user may diverge from those of the general population, extrapolating Jaynes’
rationale on maximum-entropy methods.
We investigate the profile updates leading to the best and worst overall anonymity risk for a given
activity and history. Thus, we connect the best case to the fairly recent information-theoretic framework
of optimised query forgery and tag suppression for privacy protection.
Furthermore, the analysis of our model is applied to an experimental scenario, using Facebook
timeline data. Our main objective was measuring how privacy is affected when new content is posted.
Often, a user of some online service is unable to verify how much a possible privacy attacker can find
out about them. We used real Facebook data to show how our model can be applied to a real world
scenario. This aspect is particularly important for content filtering in Facebook. In fact, as users are
profiled on Facebook, the very same activity is used to filter the information they are able to access,
based on their interests. There is no transparency on Facebook’s side about how this filtering and
profiling happens. We hope that studies like this might encourage users to seek more transparency in
the filtering techniques used by online services in general.
With regard to future work, we would like to express the relationships between users as well
as the people they communicate with, taking them all into consideration when calculating users’
privacy risk.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through
the “Anonymized Demographic Surveys (ADS)” project, ref. TIN2014-58259-JIN, under the funding program
“Proyectos de I + D + i para Jóvenes Investigadores”, and through the project “INRISCO”, ref. TEC2014-54335-C4-1-R,
as well as by the Government of Catalonia (Grant No. 2014 SGR 1504).
Author Contributions: Silvia Puglisi developed the proposal of the study, conducted all the experiments and
carried out the analysis of results. She took care of most of the manuscript writing. David Rebollo-Monedero
actively led the information-theoretic formulation and analysis of the problem investigated and contributed
in the design of the experiments. Jordi Forné participated in the conception and development of the main
idea, motivation and discussion, also supervising the design of the experiments and manuscript preparation.
All authors have read and approved the final manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Facebook. 2016. Available online: https://Facebook.com (accessed on 24 April 2017).
2. Google. 2016. Available online: https://google.com (accessed on 24 April 2017).
3. Agosti, C. Facebook.tracking.exposed. Available online: https://facebook.tracking.exposed/ (accessed on
24 April 2017).
4. Veeningen, M.; Piepoli, A.; Zannone, N. Are On-Line Personae Really Unlinkable? In Data Privacy Management
and Autonomous Spontaneous Security; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2014; pp. 369–379.
5. Getoor, L.; Machanavajjhala, A. Entity resolution: Theory, practice & open challenges. Proc. VLDB Endow.
2012, 5, 2018–2019.
6. Eckersley, P. How Unique Is Your Web Browser? In Proceedinds of the 2011 International Symposium on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium, Berlin, Germany, 21–23 July2011.
7. Halpin, H.; Robu, V.; Shepherd, V. The complex dynamics of collaborative tagging. In Proceedings of the
16th International Conference on World Wide Web, Banff, AB, Canada, 8–12 May 2007; pp. 211–220.
8. Roy, S.; Dobbins, K.; Sexton, M.; Oo, S.P.; MacDonald, R.; Nakano, T.; Post, D. Tag Based Filtering on Geographic
Regions, Digital Assets, Messages, and Anonymous User Profiles. U.S. Patent 15,170,694, 5 June 2016.
9. Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J. Optimized query forgery for private information retrieval. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 2010, 56, 4631–4642.
Entropy 2017, 19, 190 16 of 16
10. Parra-Arnau, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J. Optimal forgery and suppression of ratings for privacy
enhancement in recommendation systems. Entropy 2014, 16, 1586–1631.
11. Parra-Arnau, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J. Measuring the privacy of user profiles in personalized
information systems. Future Gen. Comput. Syst. 2014, 33, 53–63.
12. Jaynes, E.T. On the rationale of maximum-entropy methods. Proc. IEEE 1982, 70, 939–952.
13. Parra-Arnau, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J.; Muñoz, J.L.; Esparza, O. Optimal tag suppression for
privacy protection in the semantic Web. Data Knowl. Eng. 2012, 81, 46–66.
14. Parra-Arnau, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J. A privacy-protecting architecture for collaborative filtering
via forgery and suppression of ratings. In Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security;
Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2012; pp. 42–57.
15. Parra-Arnau, J.; Perego, A.; Ferrari, E.; Forné, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D. Privacy-preserving enhanced
collaborative tagging. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 2014, 26, 180–193.
16. Puglisi, S.; Parra-Arnau, J.; Forné, J.; Rebollo-Monedero, D. On content-based recommendation and user
privacy in social-tagging systems. Comput. Stand. Interfaces 2015, 41, 17–27.
17. Parra-Arnau, J.; Mármol, F.G.; Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Forné, J. Shall I post this now? Optimized, delay-based
privacy protection in social networks. Knowl. Inf. Syst. 2016, doi:10.1007/s10115-016-1010-4.
18. Ma, Q.; Song, H.H.; Muthukrishnan, S.; Nucci, A. Joining user profiles across online social networks: From the
perspective of an adversary. In Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in
Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), San Francisco, CA, USA, 18–21 August 2016; pp. 178–185.
19. Jain, P.; Ponnurangam, K.; Anupam, J. @I seek ‘fb.Me’: Identifying users across multiple online social
networks. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
13–17 May 2013; pp. 1259–1268.
20. Irani, D.; Webb, S.; Li, K.; Pu, C. Large online social footprints—An emerging threat. In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering, Vancouver, BC, Canada,
29–31 August 2009.
21. Goga, O.; Lei, H.; Parthasarathi, S.H.K.; Friedland, G.; Sommer, R.; Teixeira, R. Exploiting innocuous activity
for correlating users across sites. In Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 13–17 May 2013.
22. Chen, T.; Kaafar, M.A.; Friedman, A.; Boreli, R. Is more always merrier? A deep dive into online social
footprints. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Workshop on Online Social Networks, Helsinki, Finland,
17 August 2012.
23. Acquisti, A.; Gross, R. Predicting Social Security numbers from public data. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA
2009, 106, 10975–10980.
24. Mayer, J.; Mutchler, P.; Mitchell, J.C. Evaluating the privacy properties of telephone metadata. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 2016, 113, 5536–5541.
25. Roth, M.; Ben-David, A.; Deutscher, D.; Flysher, G.; Horn, I.; Leichtberg, A.; Leiser, N.; Matias, Y.; Merom, R.
Suggesting friends using the implicit social graph. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGKDD International
Conference On Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, Washington, DC, USA, 25–28 July 2010; pp. 233–242.
26. Rebollo-Monedero, D.; Parra-Arnau, J.; Forné, J. An information-theoretic privacy criterion for query forgery
in information retrieval. In Proceedings of the 2011 International Conference on Security Technology,
Jeju Island, Korea, 8–10 December 2011; pp. 146–154.
27. Cover, T.M.; Thomas, J.A. Elements of Information Theory; John Wiley & Sons: New York, NY, USA, 1991.
c© 2017 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
